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I. Introduction
The relationship between government and religion is a difficult one. The question of how
religious beliefs and practices should be treated by the government remains at the forefront of
constitutional debate. There are concerns about religious freedom and the extent to which it
conflicts with public duty. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." The Supreme Court's interpretation of the religion clauses has been unclear,
inconsistent, and, therefore, extremely controversial. In fact, it has not become less controversial
over time, but quite the opposite.
There has been no single standard of analysis of the establishment clause and the free
exercise clause over the last two decades. In general, the establishment clause has been
interpreted by the Court as prohibiting aid to religion, a particular religion, or a persodgroup
because of herlhislits religion. The free exercise clause has been interpreted as prohibiting h a m
to religion, a particular religion, or a persodgroup because of herlhislits religion. Like all
constitutional prohibitions, the religion clauses are not absolute prohibitions. Some aid and harm
is allowed under the establishment clause and free exercise clause, respectively. Therefore, the
crucial issue with respect to both clauses is where the line should be drawn between aid or harm
that is allowed and that which is not allowed.
Two of the justices who have contributed significantly to the Court's adjudication of
religion clause cases are former Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor. William Rehnquist was nominated Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States by President Nixon on October 21, 1971. He was then nominated Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States by President Reagan on June 17, 1986 and served on the

Court until his death in 2005.' Throughout his time on the Court, Rehnquist fought against the
expansion of federal powers and strongly advocated states' rightx2 He believes that the only
rights protected by the Constitution are explicitly stated in the document and that justices should
consider the Framers' original intent when interpreting the Constitution. Therefore, he is known
for his legal philosophy of judicial restraint, which interprets the U.S Constitution narrowly.'
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was nominated to be the first woman justice to sit on the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1981 by President Reagan. She remained on the Court
until her retirement in 2006. Unlike Rehnquist, O'Connor's core legal philosophy is difficult to
define. She is known to approach each case individually in order to arrive at a practical
conclusion."
In the first section of the paper, I will discuss Justice Rehnquist's and Justice O'Connor's
interpretation and application of the religion clauses, respectively. I will then explain the
similarities and differences between the two justices' approaches to the interpretation of the
establishment clause and the free exercise clause. After discussing the main differences between
Rehnquist's and O'Connor's religion clause jurisprudence in the second section of the paper, I
will decide which justice has a clear and workable standard for distinguishing between aid or
harm that is constitutional and that which is not constitutional. Therefore, the third and final
section of the paper will take a position on which justice has the soundest approach in his or her
interpretation and application of the religion clauses. The ultimate goal of my study will be to
reach a reasoned and defensible conclusion regarding which justice's interpretation of the

'
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religion clauses is most persuasive and whether it ought to be adopted by the Court, including its
newest members.

11. Justice William Rehnquist
A. Rehnquist 's Method of Constitutional Interpretation
One of the major problems associated with broadly-worded provisions such as the
religion clauses is how to decide what sources justices should use to interpret the text. One
approach is the original understanding approach, which argues that it is only the original
meaning that has the authority to override later majority

action^.^

An opposing theory of

constitutional interpretation is the moral understanding approach. This approach maintains that
the Constitution reflects certain general principles of political morality. Therefore, regardless of
the understanding of the drafters, justices must translate these principles in the best way into
current circumstances. In this way, it is argued, the Constitution is able to adapt to changes that
have occurred since the adoption of the ~onstitution.~
Justice Rehnquist has a clear legal philosophy based upon original understanding. Since
Rehnquist believes that the only rights protected by the Constitution are explicitly stated in the
document, he argues that justices should employ an original understanding approach. This
approach focuses on determining the historical meaning of the words as they were understood by
the generation in which they were enacted.
Perhaps the most important opinion written by Justice William Rehnquist regarding the
interpretation of the religion clauses is his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. JaSfree. In this
opinion, he explains that the Constitution should be interpreted on the basis of its original
meaning. Thus, he writes, "The true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its
5

Berg, Thomas. The State and Religion in a Nutshell. (Thomson West, 2004), 1I
Id., 12.
7
WaNace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.38 (1985) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting)

6

h i ~ t o r y , "and
~ adds, "If a constitutional theory has no basis in the history of the amendment it
seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results, 1 see little use in itn9
Rehnquist has frequently criticized the Supreme Court for its misreading of the original meaning
of the religion clauses, especially the establishment c ~ a u s e . ' ~
In his dissent, Rehnquist criticizes an interpretation based upon the separation of church
and state because it is not supported by historical evidence. He writes, "'The wall of separation
between church and state' is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved
useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned."" Rehnquist
believes that the actions of the First Congress, as well as other primary sources and the historical
circumstances surrounding the Bill of Rights, should be looked at to ascertain the original
meaning of the clauses. He cites letters and statements made by Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison in his Jaffree dissent, in addition to what was said and done at the First Congress, as
examples of historical evidence used in an original understanding approach.I2 Rehnquist
supports the use of historical evidence to interpret the religion clauses and not what the Court has
added to their original meaning. Therefore, Rehnquist's approach regarding the interpretation of
the religion clauses is based upon a belief that they should be understood based upon the words
contained in the clause and the primary sources, historical circumstances, and congressional
proceedings that produced them.
On the other hand, because the religion clauses have been incorporated into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and thereby applied to the states, even though

8

Id., 114.
Id., 113.
10
Derek Davis, Original Intent: ChiefJustice Rehnquist and the Course of American Church/State Relations,
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991), 83.
II
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U . S . 38, 107 (1985) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting).
Id.. 99.

originally they were only intended to apply to the federal government, Rehnquist has stated that
he is not sure how the clauses, as applied to the states, should now be interpreted. In his
dissenting opinion in Thomas v. Review Board, Rehnquist states that the Court has
misinterpreted the religion clauses and, thus, created "tension" between them. He contends that
"the decision by this Court that the First Amendment was 'incorporated' into the Fourteenth
Amendment and thereby made applicable against the States" is one of the causes of this
tension." Nevertheless, he does accept the application of the clauses to the states, even though
he may disagree with it. Thus, Rehnquist says, "Given the 'incorporation' of the Establishment
Clause as against the States via the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson, States are prohibited as
well from establishing a religion or discriminating between sects."I4
Another issue that Rehnquist has addressed is the meaning of the word "religion" in the
First Amendment. He did this most clearly in his dissent in Thomas v. Review Board and Elk

Grove Unified School District v. ~ e w d o w . "In Thomas, Rehnquist distinguishes between
religion and personal philosophical choices. He writes,
"In this case, the Supreme Court of Indiana 'found the basis and the precise nature of Thomas'
belief unclear' and concluded that the belief was more 'personal philosophical choice' than
religious belief. The Court's failure to make clear whether it accepts or rejects this finding by the
Indiana Supreme Court, the highest court of the State, suggests that a person who leaves his job
for purely 'personal philosophical choices' will be constitutionally entitled to unemployment
benefits. If that is true, the implications of today's decision are enormous. Persons will then be able
to quit their jobs, assert they did so for personal reasons, and collect unemployment insurance."16

This suggests that Rehnquist believes that the First Amendment draws a line between religion
and personal philosophy.
Rehnquist also differentiates between religion and our nation's religious history and
character. In his Newdow opinion, he writes, "The phrase 'under God' in the Pledge seems, as a
'"homos v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707,722 (1981) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting).
'"allace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 114 (1985) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting).
" Elk Grove UnijiedSchool District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 , 2 7 (2004) (J. Rehnquist, concurring).
16
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707,724 (1981) (I. Rehnquist, dissenting).

historical matter, to sum up the attitude of the Nation's leaders, and to manifest itself in many of
our public o b s e ~ a n c e s . " ' ~In addition, Rehnquist argues, "I do not believe that the phrase 'under
God' in the Pledge converts its recital into a 'religious exercise' of the sort described in Lee.
Instead, it is a declaration of belief in allegiance and loyalty to the United States flag and the
Republic that it represents. The phrase 'under God' is in no sense a prayer, nor an endorsement
of any religion, but a simple recognition of the fact.'"'

He acknowledges that our people and our

institutions reflect the tradition that our nation was founded on a fundamental belief in God.
However, he states that reciting or listening to the pledge is not a religious exercise, but a
patriotic one, because no one promises to adhere to a particular God, faith, or church. Rather,
participants promise fidelity to our flag and our nation.I9 Therefore, Rehnquist acknowledges
that there is a difference between religion and the role it has played in our history.
Rehnquist also reconciles the role played by religion and religious traditions throughout
our nation's history with the relationship between government and religion in the majority
opinion in Van Orden v.

err^.''

This case dealt with the display of the Ten Commandments on

government property outside the Texas State Capitol and whether the public display violated the
establishment clause. Rehnquist's argument is similar to his argument in Newdow. He states
that acknowledgement of the role that the Ten Commandments have played throughout our
nation's history is extremely common in America.
Rehnquist summarizes the relationship between religion and government based upon two
competing faces. He writes, "One face looks toward the strong role played by religion and
religious traditions throughout our Nation's history.. .The other face looks toward the principle

17

Elk Grove Uni@edSchool Disrricrv. Newdow, 542 U . S . 1, 27 (2004) (J. Rehnquist, concurring),

111..

^^
u.
l9 IL~.
20 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 US. 677 (2005) (J. Rehnquist, majority).

.- la.,

that governmental intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious freedom. This
case, like all Establishment Clause challenges, presents us with the difficulty of respecting both
faces. Our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being, yet these institutions must not press
religious observances upon their citizens.""

He concludes that although the display of the Ten

Commandments has religious significance, it also represents the nation's political and legal
history.22 Rehnquist, once again, emphasizes the American tradition of religious
acknowledgements and its consistency with previous Court opinions.
B. Rehnquist 's Interpretution of the Establishment Clause
Rehnquist narrowly interprets what the establishment clause prohibits. After discussing
the history surrounding the adoption of the religion clauses, Rehnquist concludes, "It would
seem from this evidence that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment had acquired a
well-accepted meaning: it forbade establishment of a national religion, and forbade preference
among religious sects or

denomination^."^'

He believes that the government must be neutral

toward different religions but does not have to be neutral toward religion and irreligion.
According to Rehnquist, the establishment clause prohibits "government support of proselytizing
activities of religious sects by throwing the weight of secular [authorities] behind the
dissemination of religious tenets" and "purposeful assistance directly to the church itself or to
some reIigious group.. .performing ecclesiastical

function^."^^

Therefore, Rehnquist believes

that the establishment clause prohibits only laws that advance a particular religion and not those
that advance religion in general or all religions equally. He writes, "The Establishment Clause
did not require government neutrality between religion and irreligion, nor did it prohibit the

2 1 Id.,

684.
Id., 692.
23
Wallace v. Jafiee, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (1. Rehnquist, dissenting).
24
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707,727 (1981) (I. Rehnquist, dissenting)
22

Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion."2 Discriminatory, or
preferential aid, is aid that goes to one particular religion or some, but not all religions.
Therefore, Rehnquist believes that direct aid that is preferential in nature is prohibited by the
establishment clause.
An example of a law that aids religion in general or all religions equally that Rehnquist is
willing to allow is found in Stone v. Graham. This case involved a Kentucky statute requiring
the posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools.26 Rehnquist writes, "The Court's
emphasis on the religious nature of the first part of the Ten Commandments is beside the point.
The document as a whole has had significant secular impact, and the Constitution does not
require that Kentucky students see only an expurgated or redacted version containing only the
elements with directly traceable secular effects."27 Since Rehnquist thinks that the primary
purposeleffect of the law is secular in nature, which in this case is to teach good morals, the aid
to religion is secondary or indirect. Therefore, Rehnquist is willing to allow government aid to
particular religions so long as the aid is secondary andlor indirect.
Rehnquist's argument in Mueller v. Allen, which upheld tax deduction for certain
expenses incurred in sending one's child to a religious school, also clearly illustrates his position
that secondary or indirect aid to religion is permissible. He argues that the State's decision to
reduce parents' cost in sending their children to school has a purpose that is both secular and
understandable: education.28 Although Rehnquist acknowledges that religious institutions may
benefit very substantially from the allowance of such deductions, this does not render such

'j

Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting)

tone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, (1980) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting).

" Id., 46.
" Mueller

v . Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396, (1983), (J. Rehnquist, majority).

provisions of a State's tax law as violations under the establishment clause.29 This is because
Rehnquist believes that if a particular religion benefits indirectly or secondarily from the law, it
does not matter so long as the primary purpose and effect of the law is secular.
Rehnquist's opinion in Van Orden v. Perry remains consistent with his previous
decisions in Stone v. Graham and Mueller v. Allen. This case involved the display of the Ten
Commandments on government property outside the Texas State Capitol. Rehnquist's analysis
in Van Orden is dependent upon the purpose and nature of the monument.30 He acknowledges
that the Ten Commandments are religious in nature and that the monument has religious
significance but argues that "Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent
with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment

la use."^'

Rehnquist states that

the monument's primary purpose and effect is secular and thus, does not violate the First
Amendment. He writes, "Indeed, we need not decide in this case the extent to which a primarily
religious purpose would affect our analysis because it is clear from the record that there is no
evidence of such a purpose in this case."32 In other words, if the primary purpose and effect of a
law is secular in nature, then it does not matter to Rehnquist if a particular religion benefits
indirectly or secondarily from the law.
Another establishment clause issue that Rehnquist addresses is whether the aid to religion
is coming primarily from the government or from private persons or groups. Santa Fe v.

Independent School District v. Doe clearly addresses this question, because the issue in that case
was whether a Texas school district policy authorizing a high school student's delivery of an
"invocation andlor message" before home varsity football games violates the establishment of

29

Id., 397.

31

Id., 691.
Id., 692.

'' Van Orden v. Perry. 545 U.S. 687 (2005) (J. Rehnquist, majority)
32

11

religion clause.33 Rehnquist argues that "the Court misconstrues the nature of the 'majoritarian
election' permitted by the policy as being an election on 'prayer' and 'religion.' To the contrary,
the election permitted by the policy is a two-fold process whereby students vote first on whether
to have a student speaker before football games at all, and second, if the students vote to have
such a speaker, on who that speaker will be."34 He continues, "But it is possible that the students
might vote not to have a pregame speaker, in which case there would be no threat of a
constitutional violation. It is also possible that the election would not focus on prayer, but on
public speaking ability or social popularity. And if the student campaigning did begin to focus
on prayer, the school might decide to implement reasonable campaign

restriction^."^^

Rehnquist

determined that the election was enough to prevent the private aid to religion on the part of the
students from becoming government aid that violates the establishment clause.
It can be concluded that Rehnquist believes that the establishment clause prohibits only
laws that directly and primarily advance a particular religion or some, but not all religions.
Therefore, he believes that nondiscriminatory, indirect aid to religion in general or all religions
equally is constitutional. What matters for Rehnquist is whether a law's primary purpose or
effect is secular. If it is, then it should be upheld even though it benefits some religions to some
degree.
C. Rehnquist S Interpretation ofthe Free Exercise Clause
One of the main issues associated with the interpretation of the free exercise clause is
distinguishing between harm that is constitutional and that which is not constitutional. There are
two ways that a law might harm religion or burden the free exercise thereof: directly or primarily
and indirectly or secondarily. A law that directly or primarily harms religion is one that singles
" Snntn Fe IndependentSchool
'l

''

Id., 821.
Id., 822.

District v. Doe, 530 U . S . 290 (2000) (1. Rehnquist, dissenting).

out conduct for restriction simply because it is religious. A law that indirectly or secondarily
harms religion occurs when religious conduct is not singled out for prohibition, but collides with
a general standard of conduct imposed on all citizens equally.j6 When a law directly threatens
the free exercise of religion, the issue is whether the law itself is constitutional. However, when
it only indirectly does so, the issue is not whether the law is constitutional, but whether the
personlgroup whose free exercise of religion is threatened by the law should be exempt from
having to obey the law. Some justices, like O'Connor, believe that it does and favor granting
exemptions. Rehnquist, however, does not.
There are very few free exercise cases involving direct government harm to religion.
However, there have been several cases involving a law that discriminated against a religious
group. The Court struck down those laws, but on the grounds that they violated the group's
freedom of speech andlor press. One such case was Rosenberger v. Universify of Virginia, in
which the university refused to provide funding for a publication because it "primarily promotes
or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."j7 The Court had to
determine whether the University of Virginia violated the First Amendment rights of its
Christian magazine staff by denying them the same funding resources that it made available to
secular student-run magazines. Rehnquist agreed with the Court's decision, which is that if the
government is going to provide aid, financial or otherwise, to all kinds of groups or activities, it
cannot exclude religious groups and activities from receiving the aid without violating their
freedom of speech.
Regarding laws that discriminate against a religious group, Rehnquist addressed the
question of whether or not a law that provides funds for all kinds of education but excludes the

36 Berg
37

28.

Rosenberger v. Unhersity of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (J. Kennedy, majority).

use of those funds to pay for a theological education is unconstitutional in Locke v. Davey. In his
opinion, Rehnquist addresses whether a policy denying scholarship money to those individuals
pursuing a devotional degree violates the free exercise clause.38 In his discussion, he says that
not all harm (in this case a "minor burden") to religion is prohibited under the free exercise
clause. Rehnquist explains, "The State's interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees
is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise
~cholars."'~in addition, he writes, "We believe that the entirety of the Promise Scholarship
Program goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits. The program permits students
to attend pervasively religious schools, so long as they are a~credited."~'According to
Rehnquist, so long as the government does not require students to choose between their
particular religious beliefs and receiving a governmental benefit, the government is permitted to
deny funding to a certain group of individuals, even if it places a minor burden upon that group.
The main issue associated with the interpretation of the free exercise clause is whether it
guarantees religion-based exemptions from valid, secular laws that most persons have to obey.
Since Rehnquist does not believe that the free exercise clause guarantees religion-based
exemptions from generally applicable laws, he is willing to allow some restrictions or burdens on
the free exercise of religion. While Rehnquist believes that the free exercise clause prohibits
directly targeting and harming a particular religion or religion in general, he believes that
indirect, unintended harm to religion is allowed under the free exercise clause.
Rehnquist strongly believes that the free exercise clause does not guarantee a right to
religion-based exemptions from valid, secular laws that are generally applicable. He writes, "I
believe that, although a State could choose to grant exemptions to religious persons from
Locke v . Davey. 520 U.S. 712,726 (2004) (J. Rehnquist, majority).
"Id.
Id., 725.

state.. .regulations, a State is not constitutionally required to do ~ 0 . " ~He
' explains, "Where ...a
state has enacted a general statute, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's
secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause does not, in my view, require the State to conform that
statute to the dictates of religious conscience to any

If a law has a primarily secular

purpose and effect, then indirect harm, just like indirect aid, is allowed.
According to Rehnquist, the state of Indiana did not violate the free exercise clause in

Thomas v. Review Board when it enacted an unemployment statute that provided no exemptions
for religious reasons from a rule that prohibited persons who refused to work for personal
reasons from receiving unemployment compensation. He determines that Thomas was not
singled out by the state and, therefore, there is no reason for the Court to single him out for
special exemption. Rehnquist concludes that the state has the right to make its own judgments
about the kind of exemptions, if any, it would grant.43 Therefore, Rehnquist contends that
indirect, nondiscriminatory ham1 is always allowed under the free exercise clause.
Rehnquist elaborates upon this view in his majority opinion in Goldman v. Weinberger,
which addressed whether a Jewish Air Force officer who wanted to wear a yarmulke while on
duty indoors had a right to be exempt from an Air Force regulation relating to uniforms." He
explains, "But the First Amendment does not require the military to accommodate such practices
in the face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by the dress
regulations.. .The Air Force has drawn the line essentially between religious appeal that is visible
and that which is not, and we hold that those portions of the regulations challenged here
reasonably and evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of the military's perceived need for

41

Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 724 (1981) (J. Rehnquist, dissenting).
Id.
4,
Davis 121.
44 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 5 1 1 (1986) (J. Rehnquist, majority).
41

u n i f ~ r m i t ~ . "He
~ ' contends that accommodation is not required due to an overriding interest, the
need of the military to ensure uniformity. Therefore, it is clear that Rehnquist believes the free
exercise clause does not guarantee a right to religion-based exemptions from valid, secular laws
that are generally applicable.
It seems that Rehnquist would vote to uphold virtually any law that does not directly and
obviously interfere with religious exercise. Rehnquist's understanding of the religion clauses
allows governments at all levels to accommodate and support religious practices if they choose
to do so. Therefore, he also believes that governments at all levels may limit religious practices
if they choose to do so.46 In addition, Rehnquist's lengthy dissent in Thomas exhibits his view
that if state and local governments pass valid, generally applicable laws prohibiting conduct that
conflicts with a citizen's religious beliefs or conduct, then the government regulation will
prevail.47
It can be concluded that Rehnquist believes that the free exercise clause prohibits direct
harm to religion. He also believes that indirect, unintended harm to religion is permitted under
the free exercise clause. When a law indirectly harms religion, the issue is not whether the law is
constitutional, but whether the personlgroup whose free exercise of religion is threatened by the
law should be exempt from having to obey the law. Since he believes that indirect, unintended
harm to religion is permissible, he does not favor granting religion-based exemptions from
generally applicable laws.

D. Rehnquist on How to Resolve the Tension between the Two Clauses
Because Rehnquist narrowly interprets both the free exercise clause and the
establishment clause, be does not think that the two clauses necessarily conflict with one another.
Id.
Davis 128.
47 Id.. 150.
45
46

Although he admits that there is tension between the free exercise clause and the establishment
clause in the Court's opinions, he believes that "the 'tension' is largely of this Court's own
making, and would diminish almost to the vanishing point if the Clauses were properly
interp~eted."~~
Rehnquist adds, "I would agree that the Establishment Clause, properly
interpreted, would not be violated if Indiana voluntarily chose to grant unemployment benefits to
those persons who left their jobs for religious reasons. But I also believe that the decision below
is inconsistent with many of our prior Establishment Clause cases. Those cases, if faithfully
applied, would require us to hold that such voluntary action by a State did violate the
Establishment

Rehnquist is saying that if a state were required to grant religion-based

exemptions from valid, secular laws, it would come dangerously close to "establishing" religion
under the Court's current interpretation of the establishment clause. This implies that Rehnquist
believes that a narrower interpretation of both the free exercise and the establishment clause will
resolve the existing tension between the two clauses.
Justice Rehnquist's call for a narrower interpretation of both the establishment clause and
the free exercise clause reflects the principle of benevolent neutrality. Rather than call for
complete neutrality between religion and irreligion, Rehnquist believes that only neutrality
among particular religions is required by the religion clauses. For Rehnquist, the natural
corollary to the permissible accommodation of religion under the establishment clause is the
permissible restriction of religion under the free exercise clause. Rehnquist's interpretation of
the establishment clause allows for the accommodation of religion, while on the other hand, his
interpretation of the free exercise clause does not accommodate religion. In both cases,

'' Thornas v. Review Board. 450 U.S. 707,723 (1981) (1. Rehnquist, dissenting).
49 Id.,

725.

Rehnquist is deferring to majoritarian democracy.50 Such an approach, according to Rehnquist,
would solve the problems created by the Court.
111. Justice Sandra Day 0 'Connor
A. 0 'Connor's Method of Constitutional Interpretation
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor interprets the free exercise clause and establishment clause
on the basis of their original meaning. However, whereas she finds the original meaning of the
free exercise clause to be clear, she does not find the meaning of the establishment clause to be
as clear. In her dissenting opinion in City of Boernes v. Flores, she relies on historical evidence
to cast doubt on the Court's current interpretation of the free exercise clause.51 She writes, "The
record instead reveals that its drafters and ratifiers more likely viewed the Free Exercise Clause
as a guarantee that the government may not unnecessarily hinder believers from freely practicing
their religion."52 O'Connor uses historical evidence to show that when religious beliefs conflict
with civil law, the free exercise clause was originally meant to allow religion to prevail unless
important state interests require otherwise. She explains, "Although the Framers may not have
asked precisely the questions about religious liberty that we do today, the historical record
indicates that they believed that the Constitution affirmatively protects religious free exercise and
that it limits the government's ability to intrude on religious practice."53 In order to discern the
original meaning of the free exercise clause, O'Connor discusses the existence of state
constitutional provisions, the practice of colonies and early states in regards to religion, and the
writings of early leaders who helped to shape our Nation.

50

Davis 150.
Ciry ofBoernes v. Flores. 521 U.S. 507, 550 (1997) (J. O'Connor, dissenting)
52 id.
Id., 551.

JI

>'

Although O'Connor primarily relies upon the original meaning of the religion clauses,
she is not limited by it when that meaning is unclear. In her concurring opinion in Wallace v.

Jaffree, she explains, "This uncertainty as to the intent of the Framers of the Bill of Rights does
not mean we should ignore history for guidance on the role of religion in public education. The
Court has not done so. When the intent of the Framers is unclear, I believe we must employ both
history and reason in our analysis."54 This suggests that O'Connor primarily relies upon an
original understanding approach when interpreting the establishment clause but is not limited by
it when that meaning is unclear.
Another issue that O'Connor has addressed, although briefly, is the meaning of the word
"religion" in the First Amendment. O'Connor fails to differentiate between religion and personal
philosophical choice like Rehnquist does. However, she does vaguely address the question of
what constitutes religion in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow. In Newdow,
O'Connor distinguishes between religion and ceremonial deism. She acknowledges that the
Court has permitted the government, in some instances, to refer to or commemorate religion in
public life and believes "that although those references speak to the language of religious belief,
they are more properly understood as employing the idiom for essentially secular purposes."55
One such purpose is the role of religion in our history.
O'Connor also uses history to affirm the view that religious freedom is so fundamental
that it is appropriate for the Court to apply it to the states via the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In McCreary County v ACLU, O'Connor discusses the Founders' plan
to preserve religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society.56 She writes,
"Our guiding principle has been James Madison's--that '[tlhe Religion . . . of every man must be
Wallace v. Jafiee, 472 U . S . 38, 82 (1985) (I. O'Connor, concurring).
Elk Grove Unlfied School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1,36 (2004) (1. O'Connor, concurring)
56
McCreaty County v. ACLU, 545 U . S . 844, 883 (2005) (I. O'Connor, concurring).
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left to the conviction and conscience of every man.' To that end, we have held that the
guarantees of religious freedom protect citizens from religious incursions by the States as well as
by the Federal ~overnment."~'It can be inferred through O'Connor's discussion of the
importance of religious liberty that she supports the incorporation of the religion clauses into the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus, their application to the states.
O'Connor distinguishes between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause on
the basis of coercion. Although proof of coercion provides a basis for a claim under the fiee
exercise clause, it is not a necessary element of a claim under the establishment clause.58
O'Connor writes, "An Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only 'coercive' practices or
overt efforts at government proselytization, but fails to take account of the numerous more subtle
ways that government can show favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of
disapproval to others, would not, in my view, adequately protect the religious liberty or respect
the religious diversity of the members of our pluralistic political ~ o m m u n i t y . " Whereas
~~
the
fiee exercise clause is limited to direct coercion, the establishment clause is not. Merely
showing favoritism to particular beliefs or religion in general is enough to provide the basis for a
claim under the establishment clause.
B. O'Connor 's Interpretation o f the Establishment Clause

In her establishment clause analysis, O'Connor uses the endorsement test. According to
it, if a statute's primary purpose or effect is to convey a message of government endorsement or
disapproval of a particular religion or religion in general, it violates the establishment clause.
O'Connor's endorsement test relies on whether an objective observer, familiar with the text,

" Id.

County ofAllegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,629 (1989) (1.
O'Connor, concurring).
59 Id., 629.

legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive a government message
either favoring or disfavoring of religion in general or of a particular religion. In addition, the
endorsement test requires that the government not make religion relevant to a person's standing
in the political community.60

In Wallace v. Jaffree, O'Connor argues that "the endorsement test does not preclude the
government from acknowledging religion or taking religion into account in making law and
policy. It does preclude government from attempting to convey a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred."6' O'Comor writes, "What is crucial is that a
government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to
status in the political community."62
O'Comor clearly addresses the importance of public perception in determining the
presence of endorsement or disapproval of religion in general or a particular religion. In her
concurring opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, she argues that in terms of public perception, a
government program of direct aid to religious schools based on the number of students attending
each school differs meaningfully from the government distributing aid directly to individual

student^."^

She writes, "I believe the distinction between a per-capita school-aid program and a

true private-choice program is significant for purposes of endor~ement."~~
O'Comor continues,
"In terms of public perception, a government program of direct aid to religious schools based on
the number of students attending each school differs meaningfully from the government
distributing aid directly to individual students who, in turn, decide to use the aid at the same
religious schools. In the former example, if the religious school uses the aid to inculcate religion in
60

Lynch v. Dormelly, 465 U.S. 668,693 (1984) (I. O'Connor, concurring).
Wallace v. Jaffreer. 472 U.S. 38,71 (1985) (I. O'Connor, concurring).
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.668,693 (1984) (I. O'Connor, concurring).
63 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,844 (2000) (I. O'Connor, concurring).
ld., 843.
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its students, it is reasonable ta say that the government has communicated a message of
endorsement. Because the religious indoctrination is supported by government assistance, the
reasonable observer would naturally perceive the aid program as government support for the
advancement of religion. That the amount of aid received by the school is based on the school's
enrollment does not separate the government from the endorsement of the religious message."65

O'Connor contends that direct aid is unconstitutional because it necessarily entails endorsement.
There are three important cases that illustrate O'Connor's acceptance of the use of state
funds for religious purposes.66 In Lynch v. Donnelly, O'Connor upheld state support for a
Christmas nativity display on the grounds that it primarily served the secular purpose of
celebrating a public holiday.h7 She determined that the establishment clause permitted the use of
state funds for religious purposes when the purpose was secular and did not constitute a message
of endorsement. In a second case, Rosenberger v. Universitj of Virginia, O'Connor explained
that the university's public financing of a religious periodical, along with student news,
information, opinion, entertainment, or academic communications media groups, would not
violate the Establishment

Because the university subsidized such a wide array of

activities and expression, it was extremely unlikely that anyone would think that the university
itself endorsed any particular message communicated by the student groups whose activities it
financed.69 In a third case, Mitchell v. Helms, O'Connor determined that "in contrast, when
government aid supports a school's religious mission only because of independent decisions
made by numerous individuals to guide their secular aid to that school, 'no reasonable observer
is likely to draw from the facts.. .an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice
or belief."'70 These three cases all show a clear application of O'Connor's endorsement test. If a

Id., 844,
66 Brownstein, Alan. "A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and Religious Equality: Justice
O'Connor's Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment." McGeorge
Law Review,: Spring, 2001, 864.
67 Lynch v. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 688 (1984) (J. O'Connor, concurring).
68 Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 853 (1995) (J. O'Connor, concurring).
"Id.Mitchellv. H e b s , 530 U.S. 793, 844 (2000) (J. O'Connor, concurring)

law does not have the primary purpose or effect of endorsing or disfavoring religion in general or
a particular religion, it is constitutional.
O'Connor does not remain committed to the endorsement test in all of her opinions,
however. In Board of Education of Ki\liryas Joel v. Grumet, she fails to adhere to a single test
under the establishment clause. She writes, "But the same constitutional principle may operate
very differently in different contexts.. .And setting forth a unitary test for a broad set of cases
may sometimes do more harm than good."7' O'Connor continues, stating that her endorsement
test is not the only test that should be used. She writes, "Relatively simple phrases like 'primary
effect.. .that neither advances nor inhibits religion' and 'entanglement' acquire more and more
complicated definitions which stray even further from their literal meaning. Distinctions are
drawn between statutes whose effect is to advance religion and statutes whose effect is to allow
religious organizations to advance religion."72 This leads her to conclude that, "Experience
proves that the Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily be reduced to a
single test. There are different categories of Establishment Clause cases, which may call for
different approaches."73 She discusses four different categories of establishment clause cases
and says that different tests should be used for each of them. O'Connor differentiates between
cases that involve government action targeted at particular individuals, cases involving
government speech on religious topics, cases in which the government must make decisions
about matters of religious doctrine and religious law, and cases involving government
delegations of power to religious bodies.74 If there is no single test for deciding establishment
clause cases, then this implies that there is no single interpretation of the clause. O'Connor's
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Board ofEducation ofKiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,719 (1994) (J. O'Connor, concurring).
Id., 720.
Id., 721.

Grumet opinion varies significantly from her opinions in other establishment clause cases in

which she applied the endorsement test.
Although O'Connor believes government endorsement of religion or a particular religion
is prohibited under the establishment clause, she is willing to allow for the "accommodation" of
religion. This means that she supports, in certain situations, accommodating or exempting
religious conduct in the face of general laws. Corporation ofpresiding Bishop v. Amos involved
a janitor employed at a nonprofit gymnasium which was operated by nonprofit corporations
affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day

Because the employee failed to

qualify for a "temple recommendation" certifying that he was a member of the church, he was
discharged. After he was discharged, the janitor alleged that he faced discrimination in
employment on the basis of religion, thus violating 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
corporations moved to dismiss the claim on the basis of 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which exempts religious organizations from bans on religious discrimination in employment.76
O'Connor concluded that 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did exempt the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints from a generally applicable regulatory burden and did not violate the
establishment clause.
In her opinion, O'Connor determined that an objective observer, according to her
endorsement test, would perceive government support of the church's right to hire and fire
employees on the basis of religion as an accommodation of religion rather than government
endorsement of religion.77 She writes, "The necessary first step in evaluating an Establishment
Clause challenge to a government action lifting from religious organizations a generally
applicable regulatory burden is to recognize that such government action does have the effect of
l5
76
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advancing religion. The necessary second step is to separate those benefits to religion that
constitutionally accommodate the free exercise of religion from those that provide unjustifiable
awards of assistance to religious

organization^."^^ Therefore, O'Connor determines that the

endorsement of religion is not the same as accommodation of religion. O'Connor argues that
even if the government action can be characterized as "allowing" religious organizations to
advance religion, it will be upheld so long as government action itself does not directly advance
religion.79 According to O'Connor, special treatment in this case is intended to protect religious
liberty (in this case, a church's hiring process) from government regulation.
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, O'Connor attempts to differentiate
between accommodation and "unjustifiable awards of assistance" to religion. She begins by
saying that a law must be generally applicable, meaning that it is nondiscriminatory and
impartial toward religion. It must treat all groups, religious and nonreligious, equally. Because
of this notion, O'Connor argues that government classifications based on religion must be strictly
scrutinized to ensure that the government is not directly favoring or disfavoring of religion or a
particular religious belief. O'Connor writes, "What makes accommodation permissible, even
praiseworthy, is not that the government is making life easier for some particular religious group
as such. Rather, it is that the government is accommodating a deeply held belief." She
continues, "Accommodations may thus justify heating those who share this belief differently
from those who do not; but they do not justify discriminations based on sect."80 Therefore,
O'Connor believes that accommodations are permissible when it is protecting religious liberty
and not directly advancing or endorsing re~igion.~'

Id.
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Board ofEducation ofKiq~usJoel v. Grumet, 512 U . S . 687,716 (1994) (I. O'Connor, concurring).
Id., 714.

Another establishment clause issue that O'Connor addresses is whether the aid to religion
is coming primarily from the government or from private persons or groups. Board ofEducation

v. Mergens, which involved a school administration at a high school that denied permission to a
group of students to form a Christian club with the same privileges and meeting terms as other
after-school student clubs, involved this issue. The case addressed the question of whether the
school's prohibition against the formation of a Christian club consistent with the establishment
clause rendered the Equal Access Act unconstitutional. The Equal Access Act requires that
schools in receipt with federal funds provide "equal access" to student groups seeking to express
messages of "religious, political, philosophical, or other ~ontent."'~O'Connor agreed with the
majority of the Court that the school, in distinguishing between "curriculum" and
"noncurriculum student groups," was prohibited from denying equal access to any after-school
club based on the content of its speech.83 A noncurriculum student group refers to any student
group that does not directly relate to the body of courses offered by the school. A curriculum
group, on the other hand, means any student group that directly relates to a school's curriculum if
the subject matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be taught, in a regularly offered
course. In addition, a curriculum group may also include any student group whose subject
matter concerns the body of courses as a whole, if participation in the group is required for a
particular course, or if participation results in academic credit.84
In her opinion, O'Connor concludes that an open-forum policy including
nondiscrimination against religious speech would have a secular purpose.85 Since the Equal
Access Act also prohibits discrimination on the basis of "political, philosophical, or other"
Boord ofEducalion of Westside Comm~rnifySchool v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,236 (1990) (J. O'Connor.
concurring).
" Id., 241.
84
Id.
85 Id., 249.
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speech as well as religious speech, it too has a secular purpose. If a State refused lo let religious
groups use facilities open to others, then it would send a message of government disapproval of
religion. O'Connor argues that because student speech is permitted on a nondiscriminatory
basis, the students are mature enough to understand that the school does not endorse or support
the permitted student speech.86 In addition, the school administration, since it has control over
any impressions it gives its students, also has control over the extent to which it makes clear that
its recognition of the club is not equivalent with an endorsement of the views of the club's
participants.87 O'Connor determines that because the school permits student speech on a
nondiscriminatory basis, it is enough to prevent private aid to religion on the part of the school
from becoming government aid that violates the establishment clause.
It can he concluded that O'Connor believes that the establishment clause prohibits laws
that directly or primarily advance religion in general or a particular religion. Therefore, she
believes that nondiscriminatory, indirect aid to religion in general or all religions equally is
constitutional. O'Connor upholds aid to religion in general so long as it is indirect or secondary
in nature.
C. O'Connor 's Interpretation ofthe Free Exercise Clause
Justice O'Connor's belief that accommodations are permissible, when not directly
advancing or endorsing religion, is based on her fiee exercise clause jurisprudence, which is
related to the major issue of whether the free exercise clause guarantees a right to religion-based
exemptions from valid, secular laws. O'Connor writes, "The Free Exercise Clause is properly
understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious activities without
impermissible governmental interference, even where a believer's conduct is in tension with a
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law of general application."88 She believes that the First Amendment does not distinguish
between laws that target a religious practice and laws that only indirectly and unintentionally
restrict or burden a religious practice.89 She explains, "If the First Amendment is to have any
vitality, it ought not be construed to cover only the extreme and hypothetical situation in which a
State directly targets a religious practice."90 Therefore, O'Connor believes that even indirect
harm to religion should be prohibited as much as possible on the basis of the free exercise clause.
Since O'Connor believes that the free exercise clause, at least under certain
circumstances, does guarantee a right to religion-based exemptions from generally, applicable
laws, she must have some kind of standard or test for determining what those circumstances are.
She contends that in order to deny a free exercise claim, the government must show that the law
serves a compelling state interest. O'Connor writes, "Only an especially important governmental
interest pursued by narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a sacrifice of First Amendment
freedoms as the price for an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other
citi~ens."~'O'Connor states that the compelling interest test is closely related to the First
Amendment's guarantee of religious liberty, its preferred position, and its requirement "that the
Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless required
by clear and compelling governmental interests 'of the highest order."'92 Therefore, O'Connor
concludes that the government must show that an "unusually important" government interest is
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at stake and that the resulting burden is the "least restrictive means" to obtain or protect the
government's interest.93
O'Connor clearly applies the compelling state interest test in Employment Division of
Oregon v. Smith, which dealt with the question of whether Oregon's criminal prohibition on

peyote use prohibited two Native Americans' ability to freely exercise their religion.94 Two
Native Americans worked as counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization and
ingested peyote as part of their religious ceremonies. As a result, the dmg rehabilitation
organization fired the counselors, who then filed for unemployment compensation.95 O'Connor
clearly summarizes the main issue of the case when she writes, "Thus, the critical question in this
case is whether exempting respondents from the State's general criminal prohibition 'will unduly
She
~ concludes that the state's interest
interfere with fulfillment of the governmental i n t e r e ~ t . " ' ~
in the uniform application of Oregon's criminal prohibition on peyote use is sufficient to
override the use of peyote for religious purposes. O'Connor argues that if an exemption were
granted in this case, it would severely limit Oregon's ability to prohibit the possession of peyote
by its

citizen^.^'

She also determines that such a prohibition is the least restrictive means to

address the government's interest. O'Connor writes, "Oregon's criminal prohibition represents
that State's judgment that the possession and use of controlled substances, even by only one
person, is inherently harmful and dangerous."98 However, she does recognize that, "other
governments may surely choose to grant an exemption without Oregon, with its specific asserted
interest in uniform application of its drug laws, being required to do so by the First
93 Spreng, Jennifer. "Failing Honorably: Balancing Tests, Justice O'Connor and Free Exercise of Religion." Saint
Louis Universify Law Jot~rnal:Spring, 1994, 862.
94EmploymentDivision ofOregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892 (1990) (J. O'Connor, concurring).
95
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~ m e n d m e n t . "According
~~
to O'Connor, the use of the compelling state interest test under these
specific circumstances resulting in the ruling that the free exercise clause did not require the state
to accommodate these two individuals' religiously motivated conduct.
O'Connor discusses the application of the compelling state interest test in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association. Lyng involved the harvesting of timber and

the construction of a 75-mile road between two California towns through an area that had been
historically used by members of three Indian tribes. The Indian tribes used this area to conduct a
wide variety of specific religious rituals for the purpose of personal spiritual development.
Therefore, the Supreme Court had to address the question of whether timber harvesting and the
construction of the road through an area of religious significance to the Indians violated the free
exercise clause.100 She writes, "The Government does not dispute, and we have no reason to
doubt, that the logging and road-building projects at issue in this case could have devastating
effects on traditional Indian religious practices."'0' O'Connor also acknowledges the fact that
the rituals would be ineffective if conducted at other sites. In addition, she also believes that too
much disturbance surrounding the area used for rituals would result in a discontinuation of
religious pra~tices."~
In utilizing a con~pellingstate interest test, O'Connor relies on a distinction between
coercive burdens and purely incidental burdens. In her majority opinion in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, O'Connor argues that laws with the tendency to coerce

"Id., 907.
loo
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U . S .439 (1988) (J. O'Connor, majority).
lo'Id., 452.
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individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs require a religion-based exemption.lo3
She writes,
"The building of a road or the harvesting of timber on publicly owned land cannot meaning be
distinguished from the use of a Social Security number in Roy. In both cases, the challenged
Government action would interfere significantly with private persons' ability to pursue spiritual
fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs. In neither case, however, would the affected
individuals be coerced by the Government's action into violating their religious beliefs; nor would
either governmental action penalize the religious activity by denying any person an equal share of
the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizen^."'^^

Since O'Connor concludes that the harvesting of timber on publicly owned land does not deny
any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens, she
characterizes it as a non-coercive, or incidental. The burden that arises from such activity is not
coercive and therefore, not prohibited by the free exercise clause. O'Comor believes that the
compelling state interest test should be used only when a law indirectly or directly coerces
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs. It can be concluded that when a law
directly or indirectly threatens the free exercise of religion through coercion, O'Connor uses a
compelling state interest test to determine whether the personlgroup whose free exercise of
religion is threatened by the law should be exempt from having to obey the law.

D. O'Connor on How to Resolve the Tension between the Two Clauses
O'Comor acknowledges that an inherent tension exists between the establishment clause
and the free exercise clause. She writes, "It is obvious that either of the two Religion Clauses, 'if
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other. ,,,I05 She argues that the
Court's call for government neutrality toward religion has exacerbated the conflict because it
would be difficult to reconcile "complete neutrality" with the necessity to sometimes exempt a
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religious observer from an otherwise generally applicable law.'06 O'Connor writes, "The
solution to the conflict between the Religion Clauses lies not in 'neutrality,' but rather in
identifying workable limits to the government's license to promote the free exercise of
religion."'07 Since O'Connor believes that the free exercise clause, in some cases, requires the
government to lift a burden on the free exercise of religion, she acknowledges that the standard
establishment clause mandate test should be modified accordingly. Although a law
"accommodating" religion is inherently not neutral toward religion, O'Connor believes that it
can still be okay if it is protecting religious liberty and not directly advancing or endorsing
religion. Therefore, even though O'Connor is committed to neutrality between religion and
irreligion, as well as between particular religions, she reconciles her concept of neutrality with
the need to protect religious liberty in certain circumstances, so long as it does not directly
advance or endorse religion.
1V. Rehnquist and 0 'Connor

A. A Comparison oftheir Interpretation of the Religion Clauses
O'Connor and Rehnquist agree that the religion clauses should be interpreted on the basis
of their original meaning. However, they differ in their consistency in adhering to such a
principle. Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree and O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree both exhibit a reliance on history to obtain the meaning of the
establishment clause. Rehnquist, however, has a more consistent legal philosophy based upon an
original understanding of the clauses. He believes that the true meaning of the establishment
clause can only be seen in its history and argues that if a constitutional theory has no basis in the
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history of the amendment it seeks to interpret, it is difficult to apply because it yields
unprincipled results.108
Although O'Connor's opinion uses historical evidence such as the existence of state
constitutional provisions, the practice of early colonies and early states in regards to religion, and
the writing of early leaders who helped to shape our Nation, her approach remains inconsistent.
Rather, she approaches each case individually in order to arrive at a practical conclusion. This is
exhibited in her Grumet opinion, in which she fails to adhere to a single test under the
establishment clause.109If there is no single test for deciding establishment clause cases, then
this implies that there is no single interpretation of the clause. Rehnquist, however, stresses that
the historical evidence should be correctly interpreted so as to yield consistent, principled results
in religion clauses cases.
Not only do Rehnquist and O'Connor differ in their consistency in using an original
understanding approach, but they hold different positions on the incorporation of the religion
clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment. Although both have accepted it, Rehnquist has
accepted it grudgingly and questioningly. Because the religion clauses originally were only
intended to apply to the federal government, Rehnquist has acknowledged that he is not sure how
the clauses should be interpreted when applied to the states. O'Connor, on the other hand, uses
history to affirm the view that religious freedom is so fundamental that it is appropriate for the
Court to apply it to the states via the due process clause ofthe fourteenth amendment.l1° The
acknowledgement that the Court has guaranteed religious freedom by protecting citizens from
religious incursions by the States as well as by the Federal Government suggests her acceptance
of the incorporation of the religion clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment.
Wallace v. Jafiee, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (1. Rehnquist, dissenting).
ofEducation ofKiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,719 (1994) (1. O'Connor, concurring)
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B. What is "Religion "?
Another issue that Rehnquist and O'Connor both address is the meaning of the word
"religion" in the First Amendment; however, Rehnquist addresses it at greater length than does
O'Connor. Rehnquist's distinction between religion and personal philosophical choice in

Thomas v. Review Board serves to illustrate that the First Amendment draws a line between the
two."' O'Connor however, in Board ofEducation ofKiiyas Joel I? Grumet, fails to differentiate
between religion and what she calls a deeply held belief.l12 As a result, she fails to differentiate
between religion and personal philosophical choice like Rehnquist does.
Both justices do, however, vaguely address what constitutes religion in Elk Grove UniJied

School District v. Newdow. In Newdow, O'Connor differentiates between religion and
ceremonial deism. She acknowledges that in some instances, the government is allowed to refer
to or commemorate religion in public life. This is because although such references use
language pertaining to religious belief, they are more properly understood as having a secular
purpose, which in this case is acknowledging the role religion has played in our nation's
history."'

Rehnquist offers an analysis similar to that of O'Connor, distinguishing between

religion and its historical role in American history and tradition. Like O'Connor, he believes that
the phrase 'under God' has a patriotic, secular purpose, thus distinguishing between religion and
the role it has played in our nation's h i ~ t o r y . " ~
C. The Establishment Clause
Justice Rehnquist and O'Connor also agree on the fact that the establishment and free
exercise clauses have different meanings. O'Connor's ~ositionon the difference between the

'I'
'I2

'I3
'I'
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two clauses is most clearly shown in her concurring opinion in Counw ofAllegheny v. ACLU
She explains that while proof of coercion provides a basis for a claim under the Free Exercise
Clause, it is not a necessary element of any claim under the establishment c l a u ~ e . " Merely
~
showing favoritism to particular beliefs or religion in general is enough to provide the basis for a
claim under the establishment clause. As a result. O'Connor relies on the endorsement test. She
argues that if a statute's primary purpose or effect is a message of government endorsement or
disapproval of religion, it violates the establishment clause. O'Connor's endorsement test
requires neutrality between religion and irreligion, as well as among particular religions.
Rehnquist's interpretation of the establishment clause also relies on a concept of neutrality;
however, he believes that the government must be neutral only among particular sects and not
between religion and irreligion.
Thus, the major difference between O'Connor's and Rehnquist's interpretation of the
establishment clause deals with whom the government should be neutral toward. O'Connor
argues that the government must be neutral toward all different religions and toward religion and
irreligion. Rehnquist, on the other hand, believes that the government must be neutral toward
different religions but does not have to be neutral toward religion and irreligion. Although both
justices differ on whom the government can not aid, they agree on what kind of aid is prohibited
by the establishment clause. Rehnquist and O'Connor both agree that direct aid is prohibited
while indirect, nondiscriminatory aid is permitted under the establishment clause.
Because Rehnquist and O'Connor agree on what kind of aid is prohibited by the
establishment clause, they maintain the same position regarding whether the establishment clause
prohibits laws accommodating the exercise or practice of religion. Rehnquist agrees with
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O'Connor that accommodation is permissible. According to O'Connor, accommodations justify
treating those who share a religious belief differently from those who do not. They do not,
however, justify discriminations based on sect.'16 Rehnquist agrees with O'Connor because he
believes that the establishment clause does not require the govemment to be neutral between
religion and irreligion, but only among particular religions.
Although O'Connor and Rehnquist share the same position regarding accommodations,
they disagree over the point at which private aid to or endorsement of religion or a particular
religion becomes government aidendorsement that violates the establishment clause. In the

Santa Fe case, which involved a high school student's delivery of an "invocation andor
message" before home varsity football games, Rehnquist explains that the existence of the
election allows student campaigns to focus on whatever they choose; if student campaigning did
begin to focus on prayer, the school could implement the necessary restrictions."'

In this case,

Rehnquist determined that the aid to religion was coming primarily from private individuals and
not the government. O'Connor, however, voted exactly the opposite from Rehnquist in the

Santa Fe case, which implies that she did not view the election as a sufficient step to ensure an
absence of govemment endorsement.

D. The Free Exercise Clause
When a law directly threatens the free exercise of religion, the issue is whether the law
itself is constitutional. When a law indirectly harms religion, the issue is not whether the law is
constitutional, but whether the persodgroup whose free exercise of religion is threatened by the
law should be exempt from having to obey the law. However, because Rehnquist believes that
indirect, unintended harm to religion is permissible, he does not favor granting religion-based
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exemptions from generally applicable laws. However, O'Connor does. She believes that laws
with the tendency to coerce individuals of a religious group, whether directly or indirectly, into
acting contrary to their religious beliefs are unconstitutional unless the state can show reason for
the coercion. O'Connor, therefore, has a broader interpretation of the free exercise clause than
Rehnquist does.
O'Connor argues that in order for the government to restrict religiously motivated
conduct, it must exhibit a compelling state interest. Therefore, the government must justify any
substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."'

Rehnquist, however, does not employ such a test.

Rather, he relies upon a distinction between direct and indirect harm. His dissent in Thomas
clearly indicates that if state governments pass valid, generally applicable laws prohibiting
conduct that conflicts with a citizen's belief or conduct, then the government regulation will
prevail. As a result, Rehnquist does not believe that the free exercise clause guarantees a right to
religion-based exemptions from valid, secular laws that are generally applicable. In Thomas, he
argues that a State is not constitutionally required to grant exemptions to religious persons from
state unemployment regulations."9 He determined that Thomas was not singled out in this case
and, therefore, that there was no reason for the Court to now single him out for special
exemption.
E. Tension between the Clauses

Rehnquist and O'Connor both recognize the tension that exists between the establishment
clause and the free exercise clause. Rehnquist believes that the conflict between the two clauses
has been exacerbated by the Court. He argues that a "tension' exists between the free exercise
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clause and the establishment clause of the United States Constitution, but that it is largely of the
Court's making, so much so that it would almost completely diminish if the clauses were
properly interpreted.120 In order to diminish the tension, Rehnquist calls for the principle of
benevolent neutrality. For Rehnquist, the natural corollary to the permissible accommodation of
religion under the establishment clause is the permissible restriction on the free exercise of
religion.12'
In his dissent in Thomas v. Review Board, Rehnquist writes, "If the Court were to
construe the Free Exercise Clause as it did in Braunfeld and the Establishment Clause as Justice
Stewart did in Schempp, the circumstances in which there would be a conflict between the two
Clauses would be few and far between."'22 This suggests that he views Braunfeld as a correct
reading of the Free Exercise Clause and Justice Stewart's opinion in Schemnpp as a proper
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. The two plaintiffs in Braunfeld were members of the
Orthodox Jewish faith, which required them to close their places of business from nightfall each
Friday until nightfall each Saturday. They alleged that a Sunday closing law would result in an
impairment of their ability to earn a living.lZ3 Rehnquist explains that Braunzld did not make
the religious practices of appellants unlawful but simply made the practice of their religious
beliefs more expensive.'24 This explanation supports Rehnquist's view that the free exercise
clause does not guarantee religious exemptions from valid, secular laws that are generally
applicable. He determined that indirect harm, in this case a Sunday closing law, is permitted
under the free exercise clause.
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Rebnquist also cites Justice Stewart's dissent in Schempp to support his view that the
establishment clause is currently interpreted too broadly by the court. He writes, "He explained
that the Establishment Clause is limited to "government support of proselytizing activities of
religious sects by throwing the weight of secular [authorities] behind the dissemination of
religious tenets."I2' This means that the establishment clause is not violated by laws with a
primarily secular purpose and effect that secondarily or indirectly aids religion. Since this belief
underlines his interpretation of both the free exercise clause and establishment clause, it can be
concluded that Rebnquist adheres to a principle of benevolent neutrality.
On the other hand, O'Connor recognizes the tension but does not believe that the two
clauses will necessarily conflict. She argues that the challenge lies in establishing proper
establishment clause limits on voluntary government efforts to facilitate the free exercise of
1 e 1 i ~ i o n . lO'Connor
~~
believes that the conflict between the two clauses can be avoided on the
basis of religious liberty. O'Connor clearly addresses this issue in Wallace v. Jaffree. She
argues, "The solution to the conflict between the Religion Clauses lies not in 'neutrality,' but
rather in identifying workable limits to the government's license to promote the free exercise of
religion. The text of the Free Exercise Clause speaks of laws that prohibit the free exercise of
religion. On its face, the Clause is directed at government interference with free exercise. Given
that concern, one can plausibly assert that government pursues Free Exercise Clause values when
it lifts a government-imposed burden on the free exercise of religion. If a statute falls within this
category, then the standard Establishment Clause test should be modified accordingly."'27 She
argues that in situations in which the government may grant religion-based exemptions from
valid, secular laws, individual perceptions of government endorsement may not matter.
12'
12'
'21
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O'Connor assumes that an objective observer would understand the values promoted by the free
exercise clause and therefore, any other perceptions should be ignored. Whereas O'Connor
stresses religious liberty, Rehnquist emphasizes a principle of benevolent neutrality as a basis for
his religion clause jurisprudence.
F. Rehnquist and O'Connor: A Final Comparison
Although Rehnquist and O'Connor differ on whom the establishment clause should be
neutral toward, they agree on what kind of aid is prohibited by the establishment clause.
Rehnquist believes that the establishment clause only requires neutrality among particular
religions and not between religion and irreligion. O'Connor, on the other hand, argues that the
establishment clause requires neutrality between religion and irreligion, in addition to particular
religions. Both justices believe, however, that the establishment clause prohibits direct aid. In
addition. each justice argues that indirect or secondary aid to religion in general or any particular
religion is not prohibited by the establishment clause.
Regarding the free exercise clause, each justice holds a different position on whether the
free exercise clause guarantees a right to religion-based exemptions from valid, secular laws that
are generally applicable. Whereas O'Connor believes that the free exercise clause does
guarantee such a right, Rehnquist does not. Since O'Connor believes in the right to exempt a
religious observer from a generally applicable law, she utilizes a compelling state interest test in
cases of government coercion, whether directly or indirectly, to determine exactly when such an
exemption is permissible. To withhold an exemption, the government must show that an
'unusually important' government interest is at stake and that the resulting burden is the 'least
restrictive means' to address the government's interest. Rehnquist, on the other hand, does not
employ such a test. Rather, he relies on a distinction upon direct and indirect harm. He

maintains that all indirect, nondiscriminatory harm is allowed under the free exercise clause,
while direct harm is prohibited.
The set of differences between O'Connor and Rehnquist can be attributed to the large
emphasis O'Connor places on religious liberty. She stresses the importance the founders placed
on preserving religious liberty and has applied that to reconciling the two clauses. Rehnquist,
however, relies not upon religious liberty to resolve the tension between the two clauses but on a
principle of benevolent neutrality. Once again, Rehnquist's belief that the establishment clause
does not require neutrality between religion and non-religion, but only neutrality between
particular sects, highlights such a principle.
The discrepancies between O'Connor's and Rehnquist's interpretation of the religion
clauses show that the question of how religious beliefs and practices should be treated by the
government remains at the forefront of constitutional debate. It has, in fact, become even more
controversial over time as the Supreme Court's interpretation has remained unclear and
inconsistent. Therefore, numerous questions remain to be answered regarding which justice's
interpretation of the religion clauses is most persuasive and whether it ought to be adopted by the
Court, including its newest members.

V. Rehnquist and O'Connor: A Critical Analysis
The crucial issues are whether Rehnquist and O'Connor have a workable standard for
distinguishing between aid or harm that is constitutional and that which is not constitutional and
whether one justice is more consistent than the other in the application of their standard.
Rehnquist and O'Connor disagree on a number of issues: the extent to which the religion clauses
should be interpreted on the basis of their original meaning, the meanings of the two clauses,
whom the government should be neutral toward, whether the free exercise clause guarantees

religion-based exemptions from generally applicable laws, whether the meanings of the two
clauses conflict, and how to reconcile the two clauses. The differences between Rehnquist and
O'Connor's interpretation of the establishment clause and free exercise clause show how
difficult it has been for the Court to establish a clear, consistent, and practical interpretation of
the religion clauses. Both interpretations, however, cannot be correct. I will argue that Justice
Rehnquist's interpretation of the religion clauses is preferable to that of O'Connor and ought to
be adopted by the Court, including its newest members
Although both Rehnquist and O'Connor use an original understanding approach in their
interpretation of the religion clauses, Rehnquist uses his approach more consistently. As a result,
his overall legal philosophy is much more uniform than that of O'Connor, whose original
understanding approach is applied inconsistently. Although O'Connor discusses the existence of
state constitutional provisions, the practice of colonies and early states in regards to religion, and
the writing of early leaders who helped to shape our Nation in order to establish the meaning of
the establishment clause in Wallace, her application of the establishment clause remains
inconsistent because she approaches each case individually, as in Grumet, to arrive at a practical
conclusion. Her failure to adhere to a single test for deciding establishment clause cases
represents a major weakness in her analysis, which suggests inconsistencies in her original
understanding approach.
Whereas O'Connor fluctuates in her application of a single standard under the
establishment clause, Rehnquist does not. He argues that historical evidence should be
interpreted correctly so that the true meaning of the establishment clause can be
Since Rehnquist believes that the establishment clause acquired a well-accepted meaning from
the history surrounding the adoption of the religion clauses, he believes that the establishment
128

Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U . S . 38, 113 (1985) (1. Rehnquist, dissenting)

clause prohibits the establishment of a national religion and preference among religious sects or
denominations and thus, applies this to every establishment clause case. O'Connor, on the other
hand, suggests that there are different categories of establishment clause cases, which may call
for different appro ache^.'^^ O'Connor, in using an original understanding approach clearly
articulated in Wallace, still fails to adopt a single standard of analysis under the establishment
clause, suggesting a weakness that is inherent in her inconsistent use of original understanding.
In addition to a difference in consistently using an original understanding approach, each
justice holds a different position on whom the government should be neutral towards. Although
both judges allow some aid under the establishment clause, they use a different standard to
determine what is and is not allowed. O'Connor relies on the concept of neutrality between
religion and irreligion, as well as among particular religions. Rehnquist, on the other hand,
believes that the First Amendment was understood to prohibit only preferential support for
certain religions over others.'30 Therefore, he believes that the establishment clause prohibits
only laws that advance one or some religions, but not all religions. Laws that advance religion in
general or all religions equally are not prohibited. O'Connor and Rehnquist use a different
standard of neutrality to distinguish between aid that is constitutional and that which is not
constitutional according to their original understanding approach.
Related to their respective concepts of neutrality, Rehnquist offers a distinction between
religion and personal philosophical choice that O'Connor does not. In Thomas v. Review Board,
Rehnquist discusses the implications that arise from defining Thomas' belief as a 'personal
philosophical choice,' as opposed to a religious belief.I3' The main issue was whether Thomas'
decision to voluntarily terminate his employment was more a personal philosophical choice than
129
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a religious belief. The Court had to ask and answer this question in order to determine whether
any burden placed on the employee's right to free exercise of his religion was justified by
legitimate state

interest^.'^^

The Indiana Supreme Court had determined the precise nature of

Thomas' belief to be unclear. As a result, it concluded that the belief was more 'personal
philosophical choice' than religious belief. Rehnquist argues that the Supreme Court's failure to
take a position on this issue led to a major problem. He suggests that if a distinction is not made
between religion and personal philosophical choice, individuals will be able to quit their jobs,
assert that they did so for personal reasons, and collect unemployment

Rehnquist

argues that this would open the way for all kinds of persons to get exemptions from all kinds of
laws.
O'Connor, however, does not offer a distinction between religion and other beliefs, such
as personal philosophical choices. This represents another major weakness in her approach.
Although she argues that government classifications based on religion must be strictly
scrutinized to ensure that the government is not directly favoring or disfavoring of religion, she
uses the term "deeply held beliet' rather than religious belief. The fact that she is talking about
accommodations for religious groups is clear. However, her distinction between a religious
group and an individual holding a deeply held belief raises the question of whether O'Connor is
saying that accommodations should not be given just to deeply held, religious beliefs, but should
be given to all deeply held beliefs, religious or not. She states, "A draft law may exempt
conscientious objectors, but it may not exempt conscientious objectors whose objections are
based on theistic belief (such as Quakers) as opposed to nontheistic belief (such as Buddhists) or
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atheistic belief.'34 O'Connor's approach leaves room open for interpretation because it is unclear
and inconsistent. Her argument that a conscientious objector whose objections are based on
atheistic belief may be exempt from a generally, applicable law that most persons have to obey
seems to contradict her interpretation of the free exercise clause, which will be discussed later.
Another failure is O'Connor's inability to adhere to a single test under the establishment
clause. If there is no single test for deciding establishment clause cases, then this implies that
there is no single interpretation of the clause. In her Grumet opinion, O'Connor even says that
her endorsement test is not the only test that should be used.'j5 This leads her to conclude that
"Experience proves that the Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily be
reduced to a single test. There are different categories of Establishment Clause cases, which may
call for different approaches."136 She discusses four different categories of establishment clause
cases and says that different tests should be used for each of them. O'Connor differentiates
between cases that involve government action targeted at particular individuals, cases involving
government speech on religious topics, cases in which the government must make decisions
about matters of religious doctrine and religious law, and cases involving government
delegations of power to religious bodies.137 Her argument that the establishment clause cannot
be reduced to a single, unitary test represents a major weakness in her approach. Because
O'Connor argues that different tests should be used for four different categories of establishment
clause cases, this opinion suggests that she prefers a case-specific, pragmatic approach rather
then one single test for the establishment clause. This is inconsistent with the clear application
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v. 1Jniversity of Viriginia.
O'Connor's Grumet opinion also raises numerous questions about accommodation.'3s
She starts out as if she is completely committed to the concept of neutrality. O'Connor writes,
"Religious needs can be accommodated through laws that are neutral with regard to religion."'39
Not only does she call for neutrality among religions but between religion and irreligion. In
addition, O'Connor gives examples of laws that are acceptable because the accommodations they
give are given to non-religious persons (atheists) as well as religious persons. One of her main
arguments in Grumet is that what makes accommodation permissible, even praiseworthy, is that
the government is not making life easier for some particular religious group but that it is
accommodating a deeply held belief. This raises an important question: is she saying that the
only kind of accommodations (exemptions) that may be given are those that are necessary to
prevent individuals from having to act in a way that is inconsistent with a deeply held belief? If
so, this could mean that most religious institutions, like churches, could never qualify for
accommodations or exemptions because they cannot have deeply held beliefs. O'Connor may
just mean that there are many kinds of religious "exercises" that could not be accommodated by
the government because they are not required by a deeply held belief. However, her explanation
remains unclear and needs to be further clarified in order to answer the question of whether the
only kind of accommodations (exemptions) that may be given are those that are necessary to
prevent individuals from having to act in a way that is inconsistent with a deeply held belief.
O'Connor's argument in Amos, however, contradicts her argument in Grumet that what
makes accommodation permissible, even praiseworthy, is not that the government is making life
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easier for some particular religious group as such but rather, that it is accommodating a deeply
held belief.l4' By providing an exemption to a religious organization from a generally applicable
regulatory burden that did not threaten a deeply held belief, she contradicts her statement in

Grumel that accommodations are needed to protect deeply held beliefs and, thus, the individuals
who hold them. In Amos, she explains that "in order to perceive the government action as a
permissible accommodation of religion, there must in fact be an identifiable burden on the

exercise of religion that can be said to be lifted by the government action."'41 Whereas Grumet
addresses accommodations in relation to a deeply held belief, O'Connor argues in Amos that
accommodations may be related to the exercise of religion in general. What she fails to address
is a connection between the two when discussing accommodations. For example, does the
exercise of religion in general necessarily have to be related to a deeply held belief? In Amos,
O'Connor determined that the church had a right to hire and fire employees on the basis of
religion even though this did not threaten a deeply held belief. This point needs to be clarified if
O'Connor is to offer a consistent application of the establishment clause in relation to
accommodations.
Whereas O'Connor's Grumet opinion raises numerous questions about the consistency of
her interpretation of the establishment clause, Rehnquist's establishment clause jurisprudence is
much more clear and consistent. His opinions, including Van Orden v. Periy, Stone v. Graham,

Mueller v. Allen, and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe all adhere to his establishment
clause standard, which allows government aid to particular religions so long as the aid is
secondary andlor indirect. In other words, so long as the primary purpose and effect of a law is
secular in nature, then it does not matter to Rehnquist if a particular religion benefits indirectly or
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secondarily from the law. Rehnquist's method is preferable to that of O'Connor because he
shows it is able to be applied consistently, whereas O'Connor's standard is not.
Rehnquist also offers a more uniform interpretation of the free exercise clause than
O'Connor. The main issue over which the justices differ is whether the clause guarantees a right
to religion-based exemptions from general laws that most persons have to obey. Rehnquist relies
on a distinction between direct and indirect harm, while O'Connor relies upon a compelling state
interest test in both cases, so long as coercion is present.
In deciding when to use the compelling state interest test, O'Connor fails to offer a clear
distinction between what she terms coercive burdens and incidental burdens upon religion. Since
O'Connor does believe that the free exercise clause guarantees a right to religion-based
exemptions, she utilizes a compelling interest analysis. Laws with the tendency to coerce
individuals, whether directly or indirectly, into acting contrary to their religious beliefs require a
religion-based exemption unless the government can show that an "unusually important"
government interest is at stake and that the resulting burden on the exercise of religion is the
"least restrictive means" to attain the government's interest.'42 In determining when to use the
compelling state interest test, O'Connor distinguishes between coercive burdens and purely
incidental burdens.
It is difficult to understand, under O'Connor's approach, when coercion is involved
because of her reasoning in Lyng and her reasoning in Smith and thus, when to use the
compelling state interest test. Although O'Connor utilizes the test in Smith because she
recognizes that peyote is a sacrament of the Native American Church and is regarded as vital to
their ability to practice their religion, she does not use the same test in Lyng. She acknowledges
in Lyng that the rituals would be ineffective at other sites and that too much disturbance
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surrounding the area used for rituals would result in a discontinuation of religious practices, yet
does not use the compelling state interest test. She determines that no coercion is present even
though the log-rolling and road-building projects would have severe adverse effects on the
practice of the Native Americans' religion. This highlights an inconsistency in the coercion
standard used by O'Connor to determine in which circumstances the use of the compelling
interest test is justifiable.
Rehnquist, on the other hand, offers a clear approach in deciding free exercise cases. He
relies on a distinction between direct and indirect harm to religion. In Thomas v. Review Board
of Indiana Employment Security Division, Rehnquist found no violation of the free exercise

clause because the state of Indiana, in the interest of Iegitimate secular goals, had enacted a law
that denied unemployment compensation to persons who refused to do certain work for
"personal" reasons and were fired and that contained no exception for persons whose refusal was
religiously m 0 t i ~ a t e d . lHe
~ ~concludes that there is no violation because he finds that where "a
state has enacted a general statute, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's
secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause does not, in my view, require the state to conform that
statute to the dictates of religious conscience to any

Direct harm is always prohibited,

but indirect harm, under which the primary purpose and effect of the statute is secular, is always

permissible under the free exercise clause. Thus, Rehnquist's approach is always clear and
consistent. The free exercise clause prohibits direct harm but permits indirect, nondiscriminatory
harm.
In addition to having a clear and workable standard for determining what is and is not
allowed under the establishment clause and free exercise clause, Rehnquist also has a sound
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approach to reconciling the tension between the two clauses that has been created by the Court.
In order to diminish the tension, Rehnquist calls for the principle of benevolent neutrality. He
believes that both the establishment clause and free exercise clause are interpreted too broadly by
the Court. Rehnquist reiterates that the establishment clause does not require neutrality between
religion and non-religion, but only among different religions or sects. He believes that the
establishment clause limits only "government support of proselytizing activities of religious sects
by throwing the weight of secular [authorities] behind the dissemination of religious tenets."'45
Under the principle of benevolent neutrality, Rehnquist says that the establishment clause allows
indirect aid to religion, the natural corollary to which is that the free exercise clause allows
indirect restriction on the exercise of religion.'46 If the government were sometimes compelled
to single out religious conduct for exemption, this could be seen as aiding or favoring religion
within those decisions, conflicting with the establishment clause. Because of the conflict
between religious liberty and equal treatment between particular sects, according to Rehnquist,
the government is free to indirectly restrict the exercise of religion, thus reconciling the tension
between the two clauses,
Although O'Connor stresses neutrality between religion and ineligon, she believes that
the conflict between the two clauses can be avoided on the basis of religious liberty. She
upholds exemptions as part of an overall scheme that treats religion distinctively in order to
secure religious liberty. However, the fact that religious exemptions treat activity differently
when performed for religious reasons rather than non-religious reasons conflicts with her
establishment clause jurisprudence because it may, in some cases, give improper special
treatment to religion. O'Connor contends that "the solution to the conflict between the Religion
-
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Clauses lies not in 'neutrality,' but rather in identifying workable limits to the government's
license to promote the free exercise of r e ~ i g i o n . " ' ~However,
~
her reliance on coercion in
deciding when to use the compelling interest test, as discussed earlier, has not established a
workable limit to promote the free exercise of religion. It results in discrepancies such as in

Lyng and Smith, which only further undermines an approach based upon religious liberty.
Rehnquist's approach offers a better solution to the conflict between religious liberty and
equal treatment between particular sects because it rules out the possibility that exemptions may
give improper special treatment to religion. Under O'Connor's approach, the possibility exists
that exemptions treating activity performed for religious reasons rather than non-religious
reasons may be seen as special treatment, thus conflicting with her establishment clause standard
requiring neutrality between religion and irreligion.
VI. Conclusion
Overall, Rehnquist has a clear and workable standard for determining what is and is not
allowed under the establishment clause and free exercise clause. His reliance upon original
understanding offers a sound approach because he applies it consistently, whereas O'Connor
does not. Rather, she fails to adopt a single standard of analysis under the establishment clause,
suggesting a weakness that is inherent in her inconsistent use of original understanding.
In Grumet, O'Connor fails to adhere to a single test under the establishment clause. She
discusses four different categories of establishment clause cases and says that different tests
should be used for each of them. Rather than adhere to one single test for the establishment
clause, O'Connor prefers to use a case-specific, pragmatic approach. Thus, the argument that the
establishment clause cannot be reduced to a single, unitary test represents an inconsistency in
O'Connor's establishment clause analysis. Whereas O'Connor relies upon the endorsement test
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in Mitchell v. Helms, Rosenberger v. Universily of Virginia, and Lynch v. Donnelly, she suggests
in Grumet that her endorsement test is not the only test able to be used. This renders her
interpretation of the establishment clause unclear and contradictory.
In addition, O'Connor does not distinguish clearly between religion and other beliefs,
such as personal philosophical choice. Rehnquist, on the other hand, does. He argues that if a
distinction is not made between religion and personal philosophical choice, far too many
individuals will be able to get exemptions from far too many laws. Thus, the confusion does not
exist, like it does under O'Connor's approach, as to whether accommodations should be given to
all deeply held beliefs, religious or not.
O'Connor also remains inconsistent in applying more than one test for deciding free
exercise cases. Her approach in deciding whether or not to use the compelling interest test in
free exercise cases fails to offer a clear distinction between what she terms coercive burdens and
incidental burdens upon religion. Thus, it is hard to reconcile what she says in Lyng and what
she says in Smith. It is extremely difficult to see how a government action that has devastating
effects on traditional Indian religious practices, which O'Connor admits in her Lyng opinion,
does not fall under her coercion standard, whereas a law that makes a certain drug illegal, when
used in a Native American religious ceremony, does.
Rehnquist, on the other hand, has a clear approach in deciding free exercise cases. He
relies on a distinction between direct and indirect harm to religion. Thus, he determines that so
long as a state has enacted a general statute, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the
State's secular goals, a religion-based exemption is not required under the free exercise clause.
His approach is consistent and always results in the determination that the free exercise clause
prohibits direct h a m to religion and permits indirect, nondiscriminatory harm.

In addition, Rehnquist's approach on how to reconcile the two clauses is preferable to
that of O'Connor. Whereas O'Comor believes that the conflict between the two clauses can be
avoided on the basis of religious liberty, Rehnquist calls for a principle of benevolent neutrality.
Under O'Connor's approach, the fact that religious exemptions treat activity differently when
performed for religious reasons conflicts with her establishment clause jurisprudence because it
may, in some cases, give improper special treatment to religion. In addition, her reliance upon
coercion has not established a workable limit to promote the free exercise of religion. Rehnquist,
however, believes that both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause are interpreted
too broadly by the Court and thus, under the principle of benevolent neutrality, allows for the
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. As such, he maintains a workable
standard to determine in which cases accommodations, and thus exemptions, are permitted under
the religion clauses. Therefore, Rehnquist overall has a clear and workable standard for
distinguishing between aid or harm that is prohibited by the establishment clause and free
exercise clause. Such an approach should be adopted by the Court in order to reduce the
difficulties in establishing a clear, consistent, and practical application of the religion clauses.
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